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Courage to Be chapters 3 & 4
Feb. 22nd, 2025 10:50 amIt's the weekend, so back to Paul Tillich. I took a lot of notes on these chapters, but I'm not sure I'm going to transcribe them here. They were very different chapters, though; chapter three was mostly on pathological anxiety, and the difference between psychological and theological approaches to it, whereas chapter 4 was on how participation in different forms of society shapes courage. I found the second chapter more insightful until it took a weird turn valorizing American culture, which I am really finding hard to take seriously at this political moment. Also, I feel like his discussion of communism in that chapter was supposed to be critical, but it actually sounded pretty good to me.
In chapter 3, he's talking about pathological anxiety as the more psychological aspect of anxiety, distinct from the existential anxiety which is part of human nature--in other words, neurosis. "Neurosis is a way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being," which leads to a limited self-affirmation, because a person basically escapes into their "narrow castle of certitude" and defends it at all costs. Yet neurotics are often more creative (he said he's going to discuss that more in a later chapter). He also talks about how modern psychology (in which he includes Freud) debates about the origin of neurosis, and also how its primary assumption is that it's possible to get rid of all anxiety, and that is its goal, whereas theology recognizes its existential nature.
At one point I really wondered if Walter Miller had read Tillich, because he talked about the role of civilization as trying to preserve against fate and death, but that no absolute or final security was possible, and pathological anxiety (trying to attain that) leads to the security of the prisoner. He also says that biologically speaking, anxiety is more destructive than protective, unlike fear. Fear can lead to measures that deal with the objects of fear, by anxiety has no object.
He also spends some time talking about vitality as creating beyond oneself without losing oneself.
Chapter 4 starts out talking about how we are not just individual selves (though he affirms the importance of affirmation of the self as an individual) but are participants in the world. As participants we are partially identified and partially not-identified with the groups we live in. He then gives three examples of collective identities: primitive, medieval, and modern. I suspect the primitive one he talks about, like most of the anthropological primitives he's probably drawing on, doesn't really exist, though he does at least acknowledge he's talking about ideal types. The primitive collectivist is totally identified with the group; this allows him to transcend any personal anxiety into his total identification. The medievalist collectivism is more hybrid; there is a more developed sense of self, via Greek philosophy + sense of individual sin, but there's still a strong collectivist focus, which allows communal anxiety (and guilt) to be alleviated through collective ritual like the sacraments.
Then he moves to his true theme in this chapter, modern collectivist groups. He calls fascism, nazism and communism "neocollectivist" since they are less stable than early forms of collectivism, premised on a technological civilization, and all of them are totalitarian, seeing the state as a supernatural empire. He suggests Naziism was a "relapse into trubal collectivism" with its emphasis on blood and soil. Communism in its origins he sees as more rational and prophetic, though in Russia it became amalgamated with tribal Russian nationalism. Still, he talks about some of the basic principles of Communist ideology as an example of how this form of collectivism relieves anxiety.
Basically, in communism like other forms of collectivism, there is a strong willingness to sacrifice individual fulfillment to the self-affirmation of the group. The anxiety of the individual, when it comes to non-being, gets transformed into the anxiety of the collective. The collective gets seen as eternal, so even if you lose your own individual life for the benefit of the group, the collective will live on. He sees this as similar to Stoic philosophy, though here the society replaces the Logos as what is being sacrificed for. The collective replaces God in judgment, repentence, punishment, and forgiveness.
Then he transitions to talking about democratic collectivism, though first with an excursus through the Renaissance. I did like his discussion of the Renaissance ideal of the individual as a microcosmic participant in the creative process of the macrocosm.
He also said that liberalism and democracy could clash in 2 ways: liberalism could undermine the democratic control of society, or democracy could become tyrannical and transition to totalitarian collectivism. Another threat is the rise of democratic conformism.
I should probably reread the last bit on American courage, because I think my skepticism made me not read those sections carefully, but he did talk a lot about how the concept of progress affected the American character and its emphasis on pragmatism, process philosophy, ethics of growth, progressive education, crusading democracies and somehow immortality of the soul?
In chapter 3, he's talking about pathological anxiety as the more psychological aspect of anxiety, distinct from the existential anxiety which is part of human nature--in other words, neurosis. "Neurosis is a way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being," which leads to a limited self-affirmation, because a person basically escapes into their "narrow castle of certitude" and defends it at all costs. Yet neurotics are often more creative (he said he's going to discuss that more in a later chapter). He also talks about how modern psychology (in which he includes Freud) debates about the origin of neurosis, and also how its primary assumption is that it's possible to get rid of all anxiety, and that is its goal, whereas theology recognizes its existential nature.
At one point I really wondered if Walter Miller had read Tillich, because he talked about the role of civilization as trying to preserve against fate and death, but that no absolute or final security was possible, and pathological anxiety (trying to attain that) leads to the security of the prisoner. He also says that biologically speaking, anxiety is more destructive than protective, unlike fear. Fear can lead to measures that deal with the objects of fear, by anxiety has no object.
He also spends some time talking about vitality as creating beyond oneself without losing oneself.
Chapter 4 starts out talking about how we are not just individual selves (though he affirms the importance of affirmation of the self as an individual) but are participants in the world. As participants we are partially identified and partially not-identified with the groups we live in. He then gives three examples of collective identities: primitive, medieval, and modern. I suspect the primitive one he talks about, like most of the anthropological primitives he's probably drawing on, doesn't really exist, though he does at least acknowledge he's talking about ideal types. The primitive collectivist is totally identified with the group; this allows him to transcend any personal anxiety into his total identification. The medievalist collectivism is more hybrid; there is a more developed sense of self, via Greek philosophy + sense of individual sin, but there's still a strong collectivist focus, which allows communal anxiety (and guilt) to be alleviated through collective ritual like the sacraments.
Then he moves to his true theme in this chapter, modern collectivist groups. He calls fascism, nazism and communism "neocollectivist" since they are less stable than early forms of collectivism, premised on a technological civilization, and all of them are totalitarian, seeing the state as a supernatural empire. He suggests Naziism was a "relapse into trubal collectivism" with its emphasis on blood and soil. Communism in its origins he sees as more rational and prophetic, though in Russia it became amalgamated with tribal Russian nationalism. Still, he talks about some of the basic principles of Communist ideology as an example of how this form of collectivism relieves anxiety.
Basically, in communism like other forms of collectivism, there is a strong willingness to sacrifice individual fulfillment to the self-affirmation of the group. The anxiety of the individual, when it comes to non-being, gets transformed into the anxiety of the collective. The collective gets seen as eternal, so even if you lose your own individual life for the benefit of the group, the collective will live on. He sees this as similar to Stoic philosophy, though here the society replaces the Logos as what is being sacrificed for. The collective replaces God in judgment, repentence, punishment, and forgiveness.
Then he transitions to talking about democratic collectivism, though first with an excursus through the Renaissance. I did like his discussion of the Renaissance ideal of the individual as a microcosmic participant in the creative process of the macrocosm.
He also said that liberalism and democracy could clash in 2 ways: liberalism could undermine the democratic control of society, or democracy could become tyrannical and transition to totalitarian collectivism. Another threat is the rise of democratic conformism.
I should probably reread the last bit on American courage, because I think my skepticism made me not read those sections carefully, but he did talk a lot about how the concept of progress affected the American character and its emphasis on pragmatism, process philosophy, ethics of growth, progressive education, crusading democracies and somehow immortality of the soul?
