Random Ramblings

It's the weekend, so back to Paul Tillich. I took a lot of notes on these chapters, but I'm not sure I'm going to transcribe them here. They were very different chapters, though; chapter three was mostly on pathological anxiety, and the difference between psychological and theological approaches to it, whereas chapter 4 was on how participation in different forms of society shapes courage. I found the second chapter more insightful until it took a weird turn valorizing American culture, which I am really finding hard to take seriously at this political moment. Also, I feel like his discussion of communism in that chapter was supposed to be critical, but it actually sounded pretty good to me.

In chapter 3, he's talking about pathological anxiety as the more psychological aspect of anxiety, distinct from the existential anxiety which is part of human nature--in other words, neurosis. "Neurosis is a way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being," which leads to a limited self-affirmation, because a person basically escapes into their "narrow castle of certitude" and defends it at all costs. Yet neurotics are often more creative (he said he's going to discuss that more in a later chapter). He also talks about how modern psychology (in which he includes Freud) debates about the origin of neurosis, and also how its primary assumption is that it's possible to get rid of all anxiety, and that is its goal, whereas theology recognizes its existential nature.

At one point I really wondered if Walter Miller had read Tillich, because he talked about the role of civilization as trying to preserve against fate and death, but that no absolute or final security was possible, and pathological anxiety (trying to attain that) leads to the security of the prisoner. He also says that biologically speaking, anxiety is more destructive than protective, unlike fear. Fear can lead to measures that deal with the objects of fear, by anxiety has no object.

He also spends some time talking about vitality as creating beyond oneself without losing oneself.

Chapter 4 starts out talking about how we are not just individual selves (though he affirms the importance of affirmation of the self as an individual) but are participants in the world. As participants we are partially identified and partially not-identified with the groups we live in. He then gives three examples of collective identities: primitive, medieval, and modern. I suspect the primitive one he talks about, like most of the anthropological primitives he's probably drawing on, doesn't really exist, though he does at least acknowledge he's talking about ideal types. The primitive collectivist is totally identified with the group; this allows him to transcend any personal anxiety into his total identification. The medievalist collectivism is more hybrid; there is a more developed sense of self, via Greek philosophy + sense of individual sin, but there's still a strong collectivist focus, which allows communal anxiety (and guilt) to be alleviated through collective ritual like the sacraments.

Then he moves to his true theme in this chapter, modern collectivist groups. He calls fascism, nazism and communism "neocollectivist" since they are less stable than early forms of collectivism, premised on a technological civilization, and all of them are totalitarian, seeing the state as a supernatural empire. He suggests Naziism was a "relapse into trubal collectivism" with its emphasis on blood and soil. Communism in its origins he sees as more rational and prophetic, though in Russia it became amalgamated with tribal Russian nationalism. Still, he talks about some of the basic principles of Communist ideology as an example of how this form of collectivism relieves anxiety.

Basically, in communism like other forms of collectivism, there is a strong willingness to sacrifice individual fulfillment to the self-affirmation of the group. The anxiety of the individual, when it comes to non-being, gets transformed into the anxiety of the collective. The collective gets seen as eternal, so even if you lose your own individual life for the benefit of the group, the collective will live on. He sees this as similar to Stoic philosophy, though here the society replaces the Logos as what is being sacrificed for. The collective replaces God in judgment, repentence, punishment, and forgiveness.

Then he transitions to talking about democratic collectivism, though first with an excursus through the Renaissance. I did like his discussion of the Renaissance ideal of the individual as a microcosmic participant in the creative process of the macrocosm.

He also said that liberalism and democracy could clash in 2 ways: liberalism could undermine the democratic control of society, or democracy could become tyrannical and transition to totalitarian collectivism. Another threat is the rise of democratic conformism.

I should probably reread the last bit on American courage, because I think my skepticism made me not read those sections carefully, but he did talk a lot about how the concept of progress affected the American character and its emphasis on pragmatism, process philosophy, ethics of growth, progressive education, crusading democracies and somehow immortality of the soul?

It is the weekend, so once again I'm taking a break from Buddhism to read about something else. I thought I would start with Paul Tillich's The Courage to Be since it has longer, less-digestible chapters. We decided to read it for reading group since courage is something we all need in these times, though I think I had different expectations for the book. I thought it would be more existential; the opening chapter, though, is more of a historical philosophical survey of different definitions of courage from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche. I took a lot of notes for reading group, so much of this will be summary, but hopefully I won't run out of steam before I get to my own thoughts.

He's very interested in defining courage, which makes sense, and in the beginning he says that courage can't be separate from our being; in fact, he defines the courage to be as an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." After reading the whole chapter, it turns out that simple definition packs a lot of concepts from the Stoics, from Spinoza, and from Nietzsche.

One trajectory he traces through all these thinkers is a distinction between heroic-aristocratic courage and rational-democratic courage. Although in many time periods the soldier, who sacrifices his life, is seen as the emblem of courage, in general courage is connected by many (Plato, some medieval thinkers) to a certain kind of nobility (not seen to be characteristic of the ordinary person) who can sacrifice pleasure, happiness, and even one's own existence so that which is essential to the self prevails against that which is less essential. In the medieval period, the knight would be a good emblem of this. This is the courage of the will rather than the courage of wisdom. Rational democratic courage, in contrast, is discussed by the Stoics as the courage of wisdom--this was the courage of Socrates' death.

He draws a lot on both Aquinas and the Stoics to explain more about this distinction. Basically, the question is which is more essential to one's being: one's will, or one's intellect? Where should courage spring from? Aquinas says wisdom. (Aquinas, by the way, defines courage as strength of mind, capable of conquering whatever threatens the attainment of the highest good). What distinguishes the Aquinian tradition from the Stoic tradition, then, isn't the source of courage, but instead their general sense of being/ the nature of the world. Aquinas, and the whole Christian tradition (in which he includes Renaissance humanism, which he distinguishes from pagan humanism) affirms being as essentially good, whereas pagan humanism, including Stoicism, affirms being as essentially tragic.

He argues Stoicism is the only true alternative to Christianity in the west--it sees reality as fundamentally tragic but nevertheless tries to rise above it. At one point he says that when the Stoics talk about religion they suggest that while God is beyond suffering (impassive, doesn't experience it) courageous humans rise above suffering--which is ultimately superior. For Stoics, courage in part is to participate in the Logos, the meaningful structure of reality; to affirm one's own reasonable nature against what is accidental in us, and to overcome desire and fear. Desire leads to the pleasure principle, and ultimately a disgust in life; fear is ultimately fear of fear itself. To be able to affirm one's essential being in spite of desires and anxieties creates joy.

He sees Spinoza as a Neo-Stoic. For Spinoza, courage to be is an essential act of everything that participates in being. Striving makes a thing what it is, and virtue is the power of acting exclusively
according to one's true nature. For Spinoza, like Erich Fromm, love of self and others is interdependent, and the soul participates in divine power. [Note: the makes some interesting comparisons between philosophy and psychology; earlier he suggests that Seneca had a concept of a death instinct before Freud].

He sees Nietzsche answering the question what does self-affirmation if there is no self. That was actually going to be my first reflection! But he doesn't mean no-self in the Buddhist sense; he's talking more about animals and also being itself. I don't actually see him answering the question, but he did have a passage that helped me understand Nietzsche's will to power a lot better:

"Nietzsche's will to power is neither will nor power, that is, neither will in the psychological sense nor power in the sociological sense. It designates the self-affirmation of life as life, including self-preservation and growth. Therefore the will does not strive for something it does not have, for some object outside itself, but wills itself in the double sense of preserving and transcending itself. This is its power and also its power over itself. Will to power is the self-affirmation of the will as ultimate reality."

I'm not sure I learned a lot about courage from this chapter, but I definitely learned a lot about Stoicism and Nietzsche! Of course I knew a bit about both going into this, but he was very helpful in clarifying the Stoic worldview and also Nietzsche's concept of will to power, which honestly I had always interpreted before in a much more cynical light.

I want to return to his definition of courage again: an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." This reminds me, a bit, of Vervaeke's concept of the divine double, because otherwise, what is a person's own being? When we lack a stable self (which is a Buddhist concept I pretty much accept whole-heartedly), what can be an affirmation of your being other than a sort of ideal-type of the person you want to be? The Stoic and Aquinian definitions also emphasize that courage is something like standing fast in the face of one's own fears and desires--choosing the wisdom/reason to sacrifice the accidental to defend that which is true. Again, that imagines some sort of true self, some sort of stable essence against the "accidents" of fears and desires. A best self, in fact, something out of the world of Platonic forms.

I guess I can kind of see that in my own concept of courage, which is more like defending my ideals and values in the face of danger. Are my ideals and values my true self? I'm not so sure. For one thing, I know my ideals and values change over time, and I'm enough of a relativist not to think my values represent the core truth of all value, or some sort of Platonic virtue. I am reminded of all the Buddhist teachers I have been reading lately warning not to make dogmas of one's ideals. Even if I did/do believe that there are a few principles that could stand as universal virtues--like compassion for others--the forms compassion might take are quite varied, and specific actions are quite contextual. Give a man a fish/teach a man to fish etc.

The courage to try to be one's best self in the face of opposition seems like a good aspiration to have, but I'm not sure that's what Tillich means by courage.