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The Courage to Be
Feb. 15th, 2025 08:56 amIt is the weekend, so once again I'm taking a break from Buddhism to read about something else. I thought I would start with Paul Tillich's The Courage to Be since it has longer, less-digestible chapters. We decided to read it for reading group since courage is something we all need in these times, though I think I had different expectations for the book. I thought it would be more existential; the opening chapter, though, is more of a historical philosophical survey of different definitions of courage from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche. I took a lot of notes for reading group, so much of this will be summary, but hopefully I won't run out of steam before I get to my own thoughts.
He's very interested in defining courage, which makes sense, and in the beginning he says that courage can't be separate from our being; in fact, he defines the courage to be as an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." After reading the whole chapter, it turns out that simple definition packs a lot of concepts from the Stoics, from Spinoza, and from Nietzsche.
One trajectory he traces through all these thinkers is a distinction between heroic-aristocratic courage and rational-democratic courage. Although in many time periods the soldier, who sacrifices his life, is seen as the emblem of courage, in general courage is connected by many (Plato, some medieval thinkers) to a certain kind of nobility (not seen to be characteristic of the ordinary person) who can sacrifice pleasure, happiness, and even one's own existence so that which is essential to the self prevails against that which is less essential. In the medieval period, the knight would be a good emblem of this. This is the courage of the will rather than the courage of wisdom. Rational democratic courage, in contrast, is discussed by the Stoics as the courage of wisdom--this was the courage of Socrates' death.
He draws a lot on both Aquinas and the Stoics to explain more about this distinction. Basically, the question is which is more essential to one's being: one's will, or one's intellect? Where should courage spring from? Aquinas says wisdom. (Aquinas, by the way, defines courage as strength of mind, capable of conquering whatever threatens the attainment of the highest good). What distinguishes the Aquinian tradition from the Stoic tradition, then, isn't the source of courage, but instead their general sense of being/ the nature of the world. Aquinas, and the whole Christian tradition (in which he includes Renaissance humanism, which he distinguishes from pagan humanism) affirms being as essentially good, whereas pagan humanism, including Stoicism, affirms being as essentially tragic.
He argues Stoicism is the only true alternative to Christianity in the west--it sees reality as fundamentally tragic but nevertheless tries to rise above it. At one point he says that when the Stoics talk about religion they suggest that while God is beyond suffering (impassive, doesn't experience it) courageous humans rise above suffering--which is ultimately superior. For Stoics, courage in part is to participate in the Logos, the meaningful structure of reality; to affirm one's own reasonable nature against what is accidental in us, and to overcome desire and fear. Desire leads to the pleasure principle, and ultimately a disgust in life; fear is ultimately fear of fear itself. To be able to affirm one's essential being in spite of desires and anxieties creates joy.
He sees Spinoza as a Neo-Stoic. For Spinoza, courage to be is an essential act of everything that participates in being. Striving makes a thing what it is, and virtue is the power of acting exclusively
according to one's true nature. For Spinoza, like Erich Fromm, love of self and others is interdependent, and the soul participates in divine power. [Note: the makes some interesting comparisons between philosophy and psychology; earlier he suggests that Seneca had a concept of a death instinct before Freud].
He sees Nietzsche answering the question what does self-affirmation if there is no self. That was actually going to be my first reflection! But he doesn't mean no-self in the Buddhist sense; he's talking more about animals and also being itself. I don't actually see him answering the question, but he did have a passage that helped me understand Nietzsche's will to power a lot better:
"Nietzsche's will to power is neither will nor power, that is, neither will in the psychological sense nor power in the sociological sense. It designates the self-affirmation of life as life, including self-preservation and growth. Therefore the will does not strive for something it does not have, for some object outside itself, but wills itself in the double sense of preserving and transcending itself. This is its power and also its power over itself. Will to power is the self-affirmation of the will as ultimate reality."
I'm not sure I learned a lot about courage from this chapter, but I definitely learned a lot about Stoicism and Nietzsche! Of course I knew a bit about both going into this, but he was very helpful in clarifying the Stoic worldview and also Nietzsche's concept of will to power, which honestly I had always interpreted before in a much more cynical light.
I want to return to his definition of courage again: an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." This reminds me, a bit, of Vervaeke's concept of the divine double, because otherwise, what is a person's own being? When we lack a stable self (which is a Buddhist concept I pretty much accept whole-heartedly), what can be an affirmation of your being other than a sort of ideal-type of the person you want to be? The Stoic and Aquinian definitions also emphasize that courage is something like standing fast in the face of one's own fears and desires--choosing the wisdom/reason to sacrifice the accidental to defend that which is true. Again, that imagines some sort of true self, some sort of stable essence against the "accidents" of fears and desires. A best self, in fact, something out of the world of Platonic forms.
I guess I can kind of see that in my own concept of courage, which is more like defending my ideals and values in the face of danger. Are my ideals and values my true self? I'm not so sure. For one thing, I know my ideals and values change over time, and I'm enough of a relativist not to think my values represent the core truth of all value, or some sort of Platonic virtue. I am reminded of all the Buddhist teachers I have been reading lately warning not to make dogmas of one's ideals. Even if I did/do believe that there are a few principles that could stand as universal virtues--like compassion for others--the forms compassion might take are quite varied, and specific actions are quite contextual. Give a man a fish/teach a man to fish etc.
The courage to try to be one's best self in the face of opposition seems like a good aspiration to have, but I'm not sure that's what Tillich means by courage.
He's very interested in defining courage, which makes sense, and in the beginning he says that courage can't be separate from our being; in fact, he defines the courage to be as an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." After reading the whole chapter, it turns out that simple definition packs a lot of concepts from the Stoics, from Spinoza, and from Nietzsche.
One trajectory he traces through all these thinkers is a distinction between heroic-aristocratic courage and rational-democratic courage. Although in many time periods the soldier, who sacrifices his life, is seen as the emblem of courage, in general courage is connected by many (Plato, some medieval thinkers) to a certain kind of nobility (not seen to be characteristic of the ordinary person) who can sacrifice pleasure, happiness, and even one's own existence so that which is essential to the self prevails against that which is less essential. In the medieval period, the knight would be a good emblem of this. This is the courage of the will rather than the courage of wisdom. Rational democratic courage, in contrast, is discussed by the Stoics as the courage of wisdom--this was the courage of Socrates' death.
He draws a lot on both Aquinas and the Stoics to explain more about this distinction. Basically, the question is which is more essential to one's being: one's will, or one's intellect? Where should courage spring from? Aquinas says wisdom. (Aquinas, by the way, defines courage as strength of mind, capable of conquering whatever threatens the attainment of the highest good). What distinguishes the Aquinian tradition from the Stoic tradition, then, isn't the source of courage, but instead their general sense of being/ the nature of the world. Aquinas, and the whole Christian tradition (in which he includes Renaissance humanism, which he distinguishes from pagan humanism) affirms being as essentially good, whereas pagan humanism, including Stoicism, affirms being as essentially tragic.
He argues Stoicism is the only true alternative to Christianity in the west--it sees reality as fundamentally tragic but nevertheless tries to rise above it. At one point he says that when the Stoics talk about religion they suggest that while God is beyond suffering (impassive, doesn't experience it) courageous humans rise above suffering--which is ultimately superior. For Stoics, courage in part is to participate in the Logos, the meaningful structure of reality; to affirm one's own reasonable nature against what is accidental in us, and to overcome desire and fear. Desire leads to the pleasure principle, and ultimately a disgust in life; fear is ultimately fear of fear itself. To be able to affirm one's essential being in spite of desires and anxieties creates joy.
He sees Spinoza as a Neo-Stoic. For Spinoza, courage to be is an essential act of everything that participates in being. Striving makes a thing what it is, and virtue is the power of acting exclusively
according to one's true nature. For Spinoza, like Erich Fromm, love of self and others is interdependent, and the soul participates in divine power. [Note: the makes some interesting comparisons between philosophy and psychology; earlier he suggests that Seneca had a concept of a death instinct before Freud].
He sees Nietzsche answering the question what does self-affirmation if there is no self. That was actually going to be my first reflection! But he doesn't mean no-self in the Buddhist sense; he's talking more about animals and also being itself. I don't actually see him answering the question, but he did have a passage that helped me understand Nietzsche's will to power a lot better:
"Nietzsche's will to power is neither will nor power, that is, neither will in the psychological sense nor power in the sociological sense. It designates the self-affirmation of life as life, including self-preservation and growth. Therefore the will does not strive for something it does not have, for some object outside itself, but wills itself in the double sense of preserving and transcending itself. This is its power and also its power over itself. Will to power is the self-affirmation of the will as ultimate reality."
I'm not sure I learned a lot about courage from this chapter, but I definitely learned a lot about Stoicism and Nietzsche! Of course I knew a bit about both going into this, but he was very helpful in clarifying the Stoic worldview and also Nietzsche's concept of will to power, which honestly I had always interpreted before in a much more cynical light.
I want to return to his definition of courage again: an "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation." This reminds me, a bit, of Vervaeke's concept of the divine double, because otherwise, what is a person's own being? When we lack a stable self (which is a Buddhist concept I pretty much accept whole-heartedly), what can be an affirmation of your being other than a sort of ideal-type of the person you want to be? The Stoic and Aquinian definitions also emphasize that courage is something like standing fast in the face of one's own fears and desires--choosing the wisdom/reason to sacrifice the accidental to defend that which is true. Again, that imagines some sort of true self, some sort of stable essence against the "accidents" of fears and desires. A best self, in fact, something out of the world of Platonic forms.
I guess I can kind of see that in my own concept of courage, which is more like defending my ideals and values in the face of danger. Are my ideals and values my true self? I'm not so sure. For one thing, I know my ideals and values change over time, and I'm enough of a relativist not to think my values represent the core truth of all value, or some sort of Platonic virtue. I am reminded of all the Buddhist teachers I have been reading lately warning not to make dogmas of one's ideals. Even if I did/do believe that there are a few principles that could stand as universal virtues--like compassion for others--the forms compassion might take are quite varied, and specific actions are quite contextual. Give a man a fish/teach a man to fish etc.
The courage to try to be one's best self in the face of opposition seems like a good aspiration to have, but I'm not sure that's what Tillich means by courage.
